In theory, managed care has the capacity to benefit both the Medicare program and beneficiaries. Medicare benefits from lower costs through the use of capitated rates that are set lower than average FFS costs. Moreover, market competition among plans, and between managed care plans and the FFS sector pressures plans to provide higher quality services, better benefits, and lower out-of-pocket costs lest plans lose enrollees to competitors.
For more than a decade, the federal government has sought to increase the number of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in managed care plans in hopes that Medicare managed care (MMC) would contain costs while providing a broader range of services than the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare program. From a small number of demonstration projects in the early 1980s, the number of MMC contracts grew to 346 by 1998. In that year, approximately 16% of Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in an MMC plan. Those numbers have since declined somewhat. However, the stated intentions of the chairs of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Health subcommittee to revitalize the MedicareϩChoice program (the current name for the MMC program), and President Bush's endorsement of the work of the Bipartisan Commission on Medicare Reform and the BreauxFrist Medicare Reform Bill all suggest continued political support for Medicare managed care.
In theory, managed care has the capacity to benefit both the Medicare program and beneficiaries. Medicare benefits from lower costs through the use of capitated rates that are set lower than average FFS costs. Moreover, market competition among plans, and between managed care plans and the FFS sector pressures plans to provide higher quality services, better benefits, and lower out-of-pocket costs lest plans lose enrollees to competitors.
In fact, a sicker-than-average group of patients has opted to remain in FFS, while a healthier group has enrolled in MMC plans. Thus, the MedicareϩChoice plans have benefited from favorable risk selection relative to traditional FFS Medicare. As a result, the Medicare program has spent more on MedicareϩChoice enrollees than it would have spent on their care in the absence of the managed care program (Brown et al. 1993; Physician Payment Review Commission 1996; Riley et al. 1996; General Accounting Office 1999) . Furthermore, plans have been given an incentive to try to attract the healthiest beneficiaries from the FFS sector, rather than to provide superior benefits and services to all beneficiaries.
Just as plans have an incentive to selectively recruit healthier-than-average potential members from the FFS population, plans also have an incentive to recruit and retain healthier members than their competitors. Such incentives can distort service provision and benefits design by encouraging the coverage of benefits and services that improve selection of healthy enrollees rather than those that best improve members' health (Frank et al. 2000) . The same plan characteristics that facilitate favorable selection relative to FFS also can trigger risk selection among competing plans. Among these characteristics are use of marketing strategies aimed at active seniors, networks that include or exclude certain types of specialists, referral and service approval policies, and ease of access to services. Plan location also can engender selection if plans construct their service areas or networks to encompass areas where the potential enrollee population is relatively healthy.
Such potential selection among plans raises serious equity issues. If sicker beneficiaries are concentrated in certain plans but those plans are not adequately reimbursed given the uneven distribution of illness, either the plans with sicker members suffer financially or they must be less generous to their members than more favorably selected plans. Those plans might be driven to withdraw from the market.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS, formerly the Health Care Financing Administration or HCFA) recently have acted to address this problem. In 2000, CMS began to phase in adjustments to MMC capitation rates based on enrollees' inpatient diagnoses during the previous year; this was done in an effort to bring capitation rates into closer alignment with the actual costs of MMC enrollees. However, the current adjusters capture only a portion of the expected differences in costs between FFS and MMC enrollees and it is not known how much of the difference in plan costs they capture.
Hypotheses and Analytic Strategy
Our study uses a relatively new national data source: the MMC implementation of the Consumer Assessments of Health Plans Survey (CAHPS-MMC). This survey has been administered to samples of members of MMC plans since early 1998 to elicit reports and ratings of health care quality that are used to support consumer choice and quality improvement efforts. Information also is collected on the members' self-reported health status and conditions. Consequently, the CAHPS survey provides a unique opportunity to assess risk selection among plans using a national sample with information not available on medical claims.
We hypothesized that the health status of members of different plans would vary, and that these differences would translate into substantial variations in mean predicted costs at competing plans. We also theorized that beneficiaries with similar types of conditions would be attracted to the same plans. For example, we thought that beneficiaries with chronic conditions would be attracted to certain plans and that these patterns would be consistent across elderly and disabled beneficiaries. We further hypothesized that variation among plans would be attributable in part to differential enrollment across geographic areas within a market area (i.e., systematic enrollment from areas where MMC enrollees have better or worse average health status), and in part to differential enrollment of sicker or healthier patients within the same areas.
We used health-related characteristics from CAHPS-MMC to investigate these hypotheses about differences in member case mix among competing plans. Using factor analysis, we investigated whether there were patterns in the sorting of beneficiaries among plans associated with measures of underlying health and disability, and whether there was differential selection of elderly versus disabled beneficiaries. To quantify the implications of the observed differences for costs of care, we used cost data for FFS beneficiaries in the Medicare Current Ben-eficiary Survey to predict relative costs given health-related survey measures. We examined the extent to which geographical patterns of enrollment explain the observed differences in case mix among plans, compared to the effects of selective enrollment within common geographical areas.
We found strong support for each of our hypotheses, indicating that plans' selective enrollment of chronically ill and functionally impaired beneficiaries is a serious problem worthy of policymakers' attention and further research.
Previous Research
To date, there has been relatively little evidence on whether some MedicareϩChoice plans experience favorable risk selection relative to competing plans or what the patterns of risk selection among plans might be (e.g., the prevalence of various health conditions in plans with adverse selection). Thus, we do not know the extent to which risk selection among MMC plans operating in the same markets might undermine beneficial competition among plans.
Researchers interested in investigating risk selection among plans have been hampered by limitations of available data. MMC plans' records of enrollees' utilization of services (from which health status and conditions can be deduced) have not been accessible to CMS. Despite new reporting requirements for the inpatient diagnostic data needed for risk adjustment, physician encounter data and hospital outpatient encounter data will not start to be collected until this summer. Such outpatient data are needed to capture differences among plans in the prevalence of conditions that do not necessarily lead to hospitalizations.
Previous studies have quantified selection among MMC plans by assessing beneficiaries' use of medical care prior to enrollment and by comparing mortality rates. Eggers and Prihoda (1982) found that pre-enrollment expenditures were substantially lower than those in FFS for two of the HMOs they studied and slightly higher for the third. Hill and Brown (1990) found no evidence that any of the 98 plans they studied experienced adverse selection relative to FFS based on expenditures prior to enrollment, hospitalizations predictive of high future costs, or mortality rates. Plans did experience, however, different degrees of selection. Ratios of plans' predicted medical expenses to average FFS reimbursements, for example, ranged from .47 to 1.17, significantly different from 1 at the lower, but not the upper, end of the distribution. Similarly, Riley, Lubitz, and Rabey (1996) found that all but two Medicare plans out of the population of 108 operating in 1987 experienced favorable selection in terms of mortality risk.
A useful alternative to patient encounter data would be a nationally collected set of surveybased measures with a sampling design appropriate to estimating and contrasting the healthrelated characteristics of members of individual plans. Lichtenstein et al. (1991) Gruenberg, Kaganova, and Hornbrook 1996) . There is also a consensus that risk adjusters such as the ''principal inpatient diagnostic cost groups (PIPDCGs)'' underpredict Medicare spending for frail elders, and that hybrid risk adjusters combining both survey and diagnostic data perform better than diagnostic risk adjustment alone (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 2000 reviews this literature).
Data Sources
This paper draws on three data sources: the CAHPS-MMC survey, the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS), and CMS' MMC contract service area file.
The CAHPS-MMC Survey
The primary data source for this paper is the CAHPS-MMC survey (briefly described earlier). We analyzed data from the first three years of the CAHPS-MMC survey, administered in early 1998, late 1998, and late 1999. Data collection methods ) and initial exclusions for Year 1 are detailed elsewhere and are similar for the other years (Goldstein et al. 2001) . In short, CMS drew a stratified random sample of beneficiaries enrolled for at least 12 months from each of the active Medicare managed care contracts. For each contract (or from geographically defined subdivisions of some large contracts), 600 members were drawn, or all eligible enrollees if there were fewer than 600 enrolled under the contract. Sampled members were mailed a survey (twice if needed), with telephone followup of nonrespondents for whom phone numbers were available. The overall response rate over three years was 81%, and exceeded 73% for all but 10% of the survey units. Our sample, after initial exclusions, included a total of 394,228 respondents. We dropped 8,229 respondents (2.1%) whose mailing address fell outside the contract service area (CSA) of their plan. To avoid double counting respondents, we deleted a further 19,859 observations (5.0%) for respondents who were surveyed in more than one year, retaining only the most recent response for each respondent. Of the 366,140 responses that we retained, 77,129 were from Year 1, 126,533 from Year 2, and 162,478 from Year 3. They represented 381 MMC contracts. Of these contracts, 199 were represented in Year 1, 279 in Year 2, and 341 in Year 3. 1 We analyzed 11 items related to health status and physical conditions (Table 1) . These included general health status and whether a doctor told the patient that she had a disease or condition (heart disease, cancer, stroke, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease [COPD] , and/or diabetes). Functional status items asked whether physical limitations necessitated help with activities of daily living (ADLs), such as walking and dressing, or instrumental ADLs (IADLs), such as shopping or doing chores. Respondents reported whether they had ever smoked at least 100 cigarettes and whether they were current smokers. For these variables, item nonresponse rates ranged from .8% to 3.8%. We treated nonresponse as indicating absence of the condition, except for health status, for which no such imputation could be made. An alternative treatment (omitting these cases from the analysis) made little difference to the results.
The age, sex, plan membership, and zip code of each respondent were available from CMS records. We deduced whether the member was categorically eligible by reason of disability (under age 65) or eligible due to age (age 65 and older); we call these groups the ''disabled'' and ''elderly'' subpopulations, recognizing that the elderly group also included some disabled individuals. Since age was available for the entire sample for each plan, we could calculate the fraction disabled in each plan.
For our analyses of selection within Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), we assigned respondents to the MSA of their mailing address; only 7.5% of the mailing addresses of otherwise included respondents were not in an MSA. We then defined ''plan-MSA units'' consisting of all beneficiaries under a single contract with addresses in the same MSA.
Cost Model Based on the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey
To estimate Medicare costs for CAHPS survey respondents, we relied on data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS). Sample design, data collection, and content of the MCBS are described elsewhere (Adler 1994 ).
The 1996 MCBS cost and use data set included 15,107 respondents over age 65, of whom 10,134 were enrolled in FFS and were noninstitutionalized; cost information was not available for MMC beneficiaries and therefore they were excluded from the MCBS analyses.
We began by fitting a cost model using matched survey items from the CAHPS and MCBS. We first compared marginal distributions of responses to corresponding measures of health status in elderly CAHPS and MCBS respondents (restricting the MCBS sample to MMC members). Where they were dissimilar, we considered alternative codings of the CAHPS variables to make the distributions more comparable, so that models fitted to the MCBS could be applied to generate predicted costs for each CAHPS respondent.
The dependent variable of the cost model that we fit to the MCBS data was the ratio of total costs to the appropriate average annual per capita cost (AAPCC) for the beneficiary's county, age, and gender.
2 Total costs were defined as the sum of costs incurred by Medicare on behalf of each FFS beneficiary for Part A (hospital insurance) and Part B (supplementary medical insurance) benefits. The AAPCC is the primary basis for calculating MMC reimbursements; therefore the comparison to the AAPCC is an appropriate way to quantify selection. 3 The cost model was fit as a two-part model with two smearing factors (Duan et al. 1983 ). (We estimated separate smearing factors for the top decile and the remaining nine deciles of the predicted distribution, which empirically improved the calibration of the predictions.) With this model, actual and predicted costs were well calibrated in each decile of the predicted cost distribution. Details of the cost modeling are described elsewhere (Beeuwkes Buntin 2000) .
Using the coefficients from this model fitted to the MCBS data, we predicted costs relative to the AAPCC for each person over age 65 in the CAHPS data set (93.8% of the included cases); all analyses of predicted costs were limited to this subpopulation.
Contract Service Areas and Geographic Links
CMS provided contract service areas, defined as the list of counties in which beneficiaries were allowed to enroll under each contract as of the starting month of each year's survey. We linked each county to its MSA and federal region using data from the Area Resource File (Bureau of Health Professions 1998).
Analyses and Results

Mean Scores for Health Status and Cost Measures
Means across plans for each of the health measures and the predicted cost ratio are shown in Table 1 for the elderly and disabled populations. Means of each of the measures of disease or need, with the exception of cancer, were significantly higher for disabled than for elderly beneficiaries; the largest differences appeared for ''having a condition'' and ''needing help'' with ADLs and IADLs.
Mean predicted costs for the elderly, based on the 11 items in our cost model, were 72.7% of the AAPCC. This is consistent with previous evidence that managed care enrollees are healthier then fee-for-service enrollees, but it represents a larger differential than some previous estimates of selection in FFS versus MMC. We would not rely on this measure, however, for comparisons of managed care with fee-for-service, due to the differences in variables and methods between the CAHPS survey and the MCBS (used to estimate the predicted cost models). Furthermore, the CAHPS survey is restricted to continuously enrolled individuals and excludes patients who died during the year, typically a high-cost group (Hogan et al. 2000) .
Plan-Level Factors in Risk Mix
To determine whether members of a plan generally tended to be less healthy (or more healthy) than other plans' members by a whole set of measures simultaneously, we estimated the factor structure of the plan means on the set of health status variables. 4 We used principle factor analysis with a nonorthogonal (Promax) rotation, after subtracting the component of covariation due to sampling variability (Zaslavsky 2000; . This analysis postulates that the observed correlations among the plan-level mean health status variables are explained by their correlation with one or more latent variables characterizing the case mix of the various plans. Anticipating that the variables might be related differently among elderly and disabled patients, we separately an- alyzed means for these two groups. This approach also avoided confounding between the fraction disabled and the health characteristics of the elderly or disabled populations at each plan.
For the elderly population, a three-factor model explained 67% of the plan-level variation in the 11 health status and smoking variables ( Table 2 ). The first factor correlated strongly with poor self-reported general health status, with prevalence of four conditions (heart disease, stroke, COPD, and diabetes), and with self-reported need for help with personal care, need for help with routine needs, and having a condition that interferes with independence. We interpreted this construct as a measure of the prevalence of frailty and chronic disease. The second factor correlated most strongly with prevalence of cancer, and was negatively correlated with diabetes prevalence. The distinctness of this factor suggests that retention of members with cancer is controlled by characteristics different from those affecting members with chronic disease, perhaps because it is particularly related to access to high-quality acute specialty care rather than primary care. The third factor correlated with the two smoking variables and with prevalence of COPD, a condition for which smoking is the predominant risk factor. The three factors were only weakly correlated (|r| Ͻ .10 for any pair). It is important to note that the same individuals typically did not have both stroke and diabetes; rather, the same plans tended to enroll individuals with one or the other of these conditions. To isolate these plan-level effects, our analysis removed the component of covariation of the means due to correlated within-plan sampling error.
A similar analysis for the disabled population (limited to 258 plans with at least 40 disabled respondents) revealed a slightly different pattern. The first factor correlated with two ''help'' variables (personal care, routine needs) and prevalence of a condition interfering with independence. The second correlated with prevalence of chronic diseases (stroke, COPD, and diabetes) and more weakly with heart disease and poor general health status. The third factor correlated with the smoking variables. Prevalence of cancer, generally low in this population, was uncorrelated with any of these factors. The first two factors were only moderately correlated (r ϭ .40). We suspect that the slightly different factor patterns in the disabled and elderly populations reflect the fact that many of the disabled have conditions (blindness, congenital or injuryinduced limitations on mobility, etc.) which are not associated with chronic disease and may engender different needs. These conditions are not specifically distinguished, however, in the CAHPS survey.
Finally, we assessed the correlations among the fraction of a plan's enrollees who were disabled and the prevalences of the various conditions in the disabled and elderly populations to see whether there were consistent patterns of selection across elderly and disabled enrollees ( Table 3 ). The fraction disabled was positively associated with prevalence of poor health status and every condition except cancer among elderly members. In other words, plans with more (under-65) disabled members also had elderly members with characteristics similar to the disabled. The negative correlation of cancer with the fraction disabled was consistent with the explanation that plans that provide good specialty care for cancer may be distinct from those that provide high-quality primary care for those with chronic needs. The fraction of disabled enrollees in a plan, however, was less strongly related to most of the health variables for the disabled. This might occur because the disabled may have more uniform levels of need than the elderly. For each condition, however, plan-level prevalence among the elderly and the disabled were correlated. This suggests that similar dynamics drive selection for the disabled and elderly populations.
Variations Attributable to Plan, MSA, and Regional Levels
We next assessed the significance and magnitude of differences in beneficiary health characteristics among MMC plans. We also sought to determine to what extent these differences reflected variations in beneficiary characteristics among geographic areas (e.g., differences in smoking prevalence among regions, and among MSAs within regions) versus differences among plans within the same MSA. We restricted this analysis to the elderly (except for the variable representing the fraction disabled), since this group represented the bulk of the respondents and we wanted to avoid confounding selection within age group with enrollment of the disabled.
MMC contracts typically concentrate most of their enrollment in a few MSAs but may have a scattering of members in other areas. To minimize the influence on our analyses of such areas where plans had very little representation, we excluded plan-MSA units that had fewer than 100 cases (42% of units constituting only 4.1% of the respondents for survey-based measures) from this and ensuing analyses, leaving 613 units. 5 We tested the significance of variation in beneficiary characteristics at various levels of analysis using an ANOVA model with individuals nested within plan-MSA units nested within MSAs nested within regions. We tested the significance of the variation among plans within an MSA using the error term corresponding to within-plan variation on each measure. Means of each of the variables tested varied significantly among plans (p Ͻ .001) after controlling for regional and MSA effects (Table 4, column 2).
We then tested the significance of variation Notes: The columns are as follows: (1) All measures except percent disabled are based on elderly sample; percent disabled is based on entire MMC population. (2) Test of significance of variation among plans in same MSA, relative to individual-level variation. (3), (4) Tests of significance of differences among MSAs or regions, relative to within-MSA variation among plans. (5)- (7) Share of variation of plan means (excluding variation due to sampling error) attributable to within-MSA variation among plans, to variation among MSAs within each region, and to differences among regions. (8) Standard deviation (SD) (on percentage scale, except for ''general health status'' measure) for variation among plans within MSAs. (9) Standard deviation as in (8) among regions and among MSAs within a region, using variation among plans as the random error term. There was significant variation among regions for all measures except COPD and fraction disabled, and among MSAs for seven of the 13 measures beyond what would have been expected if health plans had been randomly assigned to MSAs and regions (Table 4 , columns 3 to 4). This may reflect some combination of varying average health status of Medicare beneficiaries in different areas, and selection of health risks between managed care and traditional Medicare that also could differ by area. For example, the prevalence of having ever smoked varies by region from approximately 50% to 60% among MCBS respondents, who represent the combined MMC and FFS Medicare population.
Having established the existence of geographic variation in the health status of MMC enrollees, we then estimated the degree to which it explained variation in health status measures among MMC plans. We estimated the variance components for plan within MSA, MSA, and region by the restricted maximum likelihood procedure (REML). 6 In variance component models, the fraction of between-plan variance explained by the individual plan (rather than MSA or region) ranged from 25.9% to 89.4% for the individual measures (median ϭ 67.6%). The largest relative components of geographical, rather than plan, variation were for smoking (a habit with substantial geographical variation) and the related medical condition, COPD. For the predicted cost ratio, 85.6% of the variance among plans was due to variation among plans within the same MSA. This result suggests that plan-level variation in these health-related measures, rather than geographical variation of MMC beneficiaries' health status among different MSAs, was primarily responsible for differences in these measures among plans, although Note: Each entry represents the percentage of variance among plans (within MSA) on the measure that would remain if the plan had recruited members with the average value of the characteristic for sampled members of all plans in each geographical unit (zip code or county), but retained the observed geographical distribution of members.
both sources of variation were significant. The fractions of variation in conditions, health status, and predicted cost attributable to the plan were generally high relative to those for measures of consumer assessments of plan quality, for which the median share of variance explained by plan for individual items was 47% . The estimated standard deviation (SD) among plans within an MSA for each of the CAHPS health measures, for predicted costs, and for fraction disabled appears in Table 4 , column 8. It is expressed as a percentage of the mean for the corresponding variable in Table 4 , column 9. Consider a plan that differs moderately (exactly one SD) from the mean cost ratio among plans in its MSA. The average cost ratio for such a plan would exceed or fall below the average by 8.4 percentage points, or 11.6% of the average cost ratio for our sample. For the various need and condition measures, the SD ranges from 9.2% to 35.9% of the mean, while the SD of the fraction disabled is 41.5% of its mean. Thus, there is substantial variation in prevalence of illness and predicted costs even among plans within the same MSA.
Interunit reliability (IUR) can be estimated from the F statistic for plan effects (Table 4 , column 2) as IUR ϭ 1 Ϫ 1/F; this represents the fraction of the variance of estimates for individual plans that is attributable to ''signal'' (actual differences among plans) rather than ''noise'' (sampling variability). This suggests that our three years of data yields an IUR ϭ 1 Ϫ 1/5.98 ϭ 83% for the cost ratio for a plan-MSA combination, which we consider adequately precise to be useful for risk adjustment and to identify plans with unusually low or high cost ratios (Zaslavsky 2001 ).
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Attribution of Variation to Geographical and Nongeographical Selection within MSAs
The variation in enrollees' health characteristics among plans within the same MSA is due to a combination of selective enrollment within the same geographic areas and differential geographical distribution of enrollment across the area. The latter component might be explained by the definition of the plan's CSA within the MSA, the spatial distribution of the plan's network of providers, and similar factors not specifically designed to induce selection.
To assess the component of the variation that is based on geographical distribution of membership within MSAs, we calculated the amount of variation that would exist among plans if they had the observed geographical distribution of members across zip code areas, but no systematic selection beyond that.
8 To do this, we first calculated the mean for each measure by zip code area, combining CAHPS respondents from all plans represented in the sample from that zip code. We then recalculated the between-plan within-MSA variation using these average values for every case in the zip code, instead of individual respondents' values. This approximated the magnitude of the between-plan variation that would be found if every plan had kept its current geographic distribution of sample members by zip code, but the combined CAHPS sample in each zip code was randomly distributed among plans. In effect, we simulated a distribution of members across plans in which there was no systematic selection except that based on geographical distribution. Table 5 (first column) shows the hypothetical amount of variation among plans due to within-MSA geographical selection alone for each of our measures, as a percentage of the actually observed amount of variation within MSAs. For example, suppose there had been no health-related selective enrollment among plans within each zip code, so all selection was due to the geographical distribution of the members of plans. Then if we had assigned every respondent from each zip code area the mean value of health status for all respondents in that zip code (combining all represented plans), the amount of between-plan variation would have remained about the same. In fact, using the means reduced the variance to 21.3% of its value for individual responses. Similarly, the variance of the predicted cost ratio was reduced to 16.5% of its actual value.
9 For other measures, the geographical component ranged from 10% to 47% (for smoking).
We repeated this analysis using the county instead of the zip code area as the geographical unit; we estimated the component of variation in health status due to selection of counties within an MSA by substituting county means for each case. The hypothetical variation among plans was reduced further relative to observed variation to 9.0% for general health status and 5.0% for costs (Table 5 , second column). This indicates that only a small part of the variation in mean health status among plans is explained either by CSA definition within the MSA or by selective recruitment of members from different counties within the MSA.
Discussion and Conclusions
Our analyses demonstrate significant variation among Medicare managed care plans in the health status of their enrollees, even after accounting for geographic variation. Such selection has potentially serious implications for plans' costs and financial viability: a plan with moderately adverse selection (one standard deviation above mean predicted costs) is estimated to have per capita costs 11.6% higher than its average competitor. These results illustrate the pervasiveness of selection phenomena in competitive health care markets, and the inadequacy of policies and theories that do not take them into account.
We found several dimensions of selection among plans, indicating that some plans are more attractive to certain classes of enrollees than others. Elderly enrollees with a history of smoking and COPD, elderly enrollees with a history of cancer, and elderly enrollees with chronic illnesses and/or functional limitations each tended to enroll in specific (although overlapping) sets of plans. Disabled enrollees similarly tended to enroll differentially in plans according to their health conditions. The prevalence of disabled enrollees in a plan was correlated with the prevalence of elderly enrollees with chronic conditions and/or functional limitations.
It is not obvious how plans achieve these differences in case mix. A small part of the selection might be geographical, related to the way a plan chooses to define its service area (counties within a metropolitan area) and the distribution of competing plans' provider networks across a market. This might or might not reflect an intention to recruit in areas where healthier members can be found. However, the majority of the selection is not geographically based, but rather arises from differential enrollment by health plans within the same areas.
The limitations of our analyses include several related to measurement. The CAHPS survey is not designed to measure primarily health status and conditions. Moreover, the health-related items on CAHPS do not exactly match those on the MCBS, from which the cost models are derived; hence the cost predictions we use must be treated as approximations, although they are probably adequate for analyzing broad patterns in the distribution of costs. Other surveys, notably the Health of Seniors survey, might provide more refined assessments of health status, as might a modified CAHPS with new items designed specifically for this purpose. Both the CAHPS and MCBS surveys exclude decedents. High end-of-life costs probably would tend to increase average costs in plans with many sick members, which would exacerbate the effects of selection. Finally, although CAHPS attained good response rates, we cannot be sure of the effects of nonresponse on our data.
We modeled costs relative to AAPCC under a more limited risk adjustment system than that now in use; we do not know what part of the selective differences that we found are compensated for under the new system based on inpatient diagnoses. However, only 18.8% of elderly CAHPS respondents said they had been hospitalized in the last year (and thus would be count-ed as higher-cost under the PIP-DCG risk adjustment system). This group included only 25.6% of those who reported one or more of the conditions or limitations used in our analyses. Thus, selection might have less financial impact relative to the PIP-DCG-adjusted rates, but we probably still would have found cost differences among plans.
Policymakers could address risk selection in the MedicareϩChoice program in at least two ways. One approach is to restrict the ability of plans to design products aimed at favorable selection. For example, some promotional methods and benefits are designed to appeal to healthier members. Enforcement of quality standards, especially for care of the sicker patients, also might reduce selective disenrollment of such patients by limiting the ability of plans to drive them into other plans or FFS through restrictions on access to care.
A second, possibly complementary, approach attempts to minimize the effects of selection on plan stability and policies. If premiums are adequately risk adjusted, plans can specialize in care of frail patients or those with chronic conditions and still be financially stable. Our analyses indicate that such specialization might, in fact, already be taking place.
This evidence suggests that consideration should be given to improved risk adjustment of premiums for MMC risk plans to consider frailty, stable chronic disease, or a longer-term history of disease. These factors may cause patients to consume more health services, yet might not be reflected in inpatient diagnoses, particularly when the plan is relatively successful in managing these conditions on an outpatient basis.
As a basis for case-mix adjustment of costs, survey-based measures of health status and needs have both potential advantages and disadvantages compared to alternatives. It is relatively easy and inexpensive to collect healthstatus measures for a representative sample of plan enrollees on a uniform national basis through surveys, either the CAHPS-MMC (possibly supplemented with a few more questions designed specifically to estimate predicted costs) or other surveys more specifically focused on health status, such as the Health of Seniors survey (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 2000). Survey measures have not been shown to obtain the level of predictive power possible with detailed clinical data, such as that used in the ''diagnostic cost group (DCG)'' system, based on inpatient diagnoses. Nonetheless, models combining multiple sources of data (such as self-reported function measures and diagnoses from claims) have achieved the highest predictive power (Giacomini et al. 1995; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 2000) . Finally, numerous implementation problems also must be addressed, such as the exclusion of members who died or failed to respond to the survey, and the treatment of members who switched plans.
Survey-based measures of health status and needs are less sensitive to care provision and data management practices of plans than measures based on utilization and diagnoses. A health plan might do a better job than its competitors of informing its members of their health conditions; or by providing more help (home health care, for example), it might encourage its members to report that they needed such help (Fowles et al. 1995; Gruenberg, Kaganova, and Hornbrook 1996; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 2000) . In an environment dominated by loose and overlapping networks of providers, however, we doubt that any health plan can do much directly to manipulate the way that its members report their health status, especially relative to its immediate competitors. Another criticism of patient-reported measures of health and functional status is that they are difficult to validate. But such measures, subjective or not, contain information not always available in the medical record, and are predictive of mortality (Cleary 1997 ) and costs. That said, more research is needed on the way consumers respond to health-related survey questions to demonstrate and improve the validity of survey-based measures.
Conversely, health measures based on past utilization or on records (medical or administrative) can be manipulated through ''upcoding'' conditions (describing them as more severe than they actually are) or strategically overproviding services that are markers for poor health status. At worst, a risk adjustment method that depends on inpatient diagnoses might encourage suboptimal practice patterns, such as unnecessary hospital admissions.
A final objection to using beneficiary surveys to risk adjust MMC payments is that survey measures, like utilization-and diagnosis-based measures derived from claims or medical records, are endogenous to the extent that members' health status is affected by the quality of the care provided to them by the plan in previous years. We believe this endogeneity is not relevant to risk adjustment. Risk adjustment is intended to compensate plans for costs projected for care of their members based on their health status, not to punish or reward them for previous successes or failures. As long as plans are compensated prospectively on the basis of the true predicted need of their members rather than ''gameable'' measures, risk adjustment has served its purpose. It is likely that the plans that attract and retain chronically ill and functionally limited beneficiaries are precisely the ones that Medicare should strive to retain in the MedicareϩChoice program. Medicare beneficiaries who are in poor health or have functional limitations are more likely to be dissatisfied with their care (Physician Payment Review Commission 1996; Zaslavsky et al. 2001) . A growing body of literature suggests that care for the chronically ill is best delivered through multidisciplinary care teams (Wagner et al. 2001 ). The traditional Medicare program's fee-for-service structure is ill-suited to deliver this type of care. Managed care plans can establish such programs and we hope that our findings reflect that they are doing so. In the meantime, our success in detecting selection on these dimensions using data from an existing survey indicates that policymakers could mitigate selection incentives working against such plans through introduction of better risk adjusters that incorporate survey-based data.
8 For this analysis, we further limited the data to respondents in zip codes with at least five respondents, constituting 93% of the sample, since little averaging across plans would be possible in zip codes with very few respondents. 9 If anything, this analysis somewhat overestimates the component of variation due to purely geographic selection. Sample sizes per zip code are often small (12.8% of the sample for this analysis is from zip codes with fewer than 20 sample cases), so the sample mean for each area will be biased toward the mean for the plan that randomly has a larger sample there. Consequently, betweenplan differences would be manifested as apparent geographical effects, even if there were no geographic variation at this level. Despite this effect, however, it appears that between-plan variation due to purely geographic selection explains only a relatively small component of overall variation among plans.
